Lessons from a historic example of diving safety rules violation: the case of Greek sponge divers by Tsiamis, Costas et al.
Dr. Costas Tsiamis, Department of Microbiology, Medical School, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, Greece, e-mail: ctsiamis@med.uoa.gr
www.intmarhealth.pl
Int Marit Health 
2020; 71, 1: 28–33 
10.5603/IMH.2020.0008 
www.intmarhealth.pl 
Copyright © 2020 PSMTTM 
ISSN 1641–9251
REV IEW ART ICLE
28
Lessons from a historic example of diving safety  
rules violation: the case of Greek sponge divers
Costas Tsiamis , Georgia Vrioni , Athanassios Tsakris
Department of Microbiology, Medical School, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, Greece
AbsTrACT
This study presents a historical example of systematic safety rules violations by professional sponge 
divers in Greece during the early 20th century. In light of absolute unaccountability in favour of economic 
competition and in the absence of state oversight, the profession of sponge diving had developed into  
a deadly undertaking. 
The study is based on a report compiled by Professor of Hygiene and Microbiology Konstantinos Savvas, 
which was addressed to the Ministry of Marine Affairs. Savvas’ report rested on data concerning hospitalised 
divers derived from the medical records of warship ‘Kriti’ (Crete), which escorted groups of Greek fishing 
vessels to four of their expedition in the Mediterranean over the period 1900–1903. 
Although the events explored herein took place at a time much different from the modern era with its nu-
merous advancements in hyperbaric medicine, enhanced divers’ professionalism and the establishment of 
labour rights and strict safety regulations, we should not overlook the human factor of professional explo-
itation that leads to the violation of safety rules. On the other hand, supervisory authorities entrusted with 
the responsibility of overseeing professional activities ought to be vigilant on a constant basis, especially 
in times of economic crisis that may lead to lax state functioning. 
(Int Marit Health 2020; 71, 1: 28–33)
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INTrODUCTION
A professional diver has to perform a series of underwa-
ter tasks using exclusively self-contained breathing appara-
tuses. These tasks include underwater ship repairs, dock 
construction, aquaculture, etc. Regardless of the needs or 
competition in market economies, however, divers’ compli-
ance with safety rules while underwater remains a crucial 
issue.
By examining the records of a Greek warship from the 
early 20th century, the study illustrates the lasting risk of 
inadequate or even inexistent safety among professional 
divers in conditions of economic competition. The pressing 
need for work amidst the harsh economic crisis that tor-
mented Greece in the late 19th century, coupled with com-
mercial competition, employers’ demands for quick profits, 
and divers’ low earnings that forced them to exhaustive 
dives in order to earn more money, had taken their toll on 
safety. In addition, the absence of state controls embold-
ened employers to push towards increasing their profits in 
the name of competition.
ArCHIVAL sOUrCEs
The study was based on two Greek archival sources: 
a) the report on decompression sickness (also known as the 
divers’ disease), which was prepared by Konstantinos Sav-
vas, Professor of Microbiology and Hygiene at the Medical 
School of the University of Athens, on behalf of the Royal 
Medical Council and addressed to the Ministry of Marine Af-
fairs (1904), and b) the data collected by Dr. Sfinis onboard 
the warship ‘Kriti’, which escorted Greek fishing vessels in 
the Mediterranean.
Professor Konstantinos Savvas (1861–1929) was 
the founder of Hygiene, Epidemiology and Microbiology in 
Greece (Fig. 1). Besides infectious diseases, Savvas took 
up issues of occupational health and safety. The tragic 
rates of morbidity and mortality among Greek sponge div-
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ers prompted Savvas to examine the issue. To this end, he 
started collaborating with the officer Dr. Sfinis, who gave 
him the data contained in the medical records from four 
expeditions dated from the period 1900–1903 [1]. In an 
effort to fully comprehend the physiology of underwater 
diving, Savvas travelled to the Diving Academy facilities of 
the Imperial Russian Navy in Kronstadt in 1903, whereas 
he also studied numerous educational dives on the coasts 
of Finland [2, 3].
sPONGE DIVING IN GrEECE  
(19TH–20TH CENTUrY) 
Sponge diving constitutes a legendary chapter of the 
Greek naval history. Over the centuries, sponge diving tech-
niques evolved from diving without equipment to diving 
suits. After the establishment of the modern nation state of 
Greece, the first diving suits were introduced in the Aegean 
islands — both those that were liberated and the ones that 
remained under Ottoman control — in the first half of the 
19th century. The capability of staying underwater for longer 
periods of time soon gave rise to the problem of overfishing. 
The Ottoman Empire had prohibited sponge diving using 
diving suits up to three miles off its coast. During summer, 
the Greek fishing vessels collected sponges on the Tuni-
sian coast, moving to Egypt and Cyprus in the winter. In 
the early 20th century, more than 500 fishing vessels were 
actively harvesting sponges around the Greek islands, of 
which 150 carried oxygen pumps and diving suits. Sponge 
trade was highly lucrative, while companies had established 
branches in Western Europe where sponges were sold as 
a luxury good. In light of protecting them from raids by other 
countries’ ships, fishing vessels grouped into fleets, each 
of which was escorted by a warship. The coexistence of 
fishing vessels within the same fleet (200–250 vessels) did 
not necessarily imply their cooperation, since the islands 
competed fiercely for the distribution of marine sites of 
sponge harvesting [4].
sTUDIEs ON DECOMPrEssION sICKNEss 
Human efforts to prolong their underwater stay on the 
seabed gradually led to the creation of new distinct sci-
entific branches of Medicine. Alfred Léroy de Méricourt 
became interested in decompression sickness and pub-
lished his relevant thesis titled ‘Considérations sur l’hygiène 
des pecheurs d’éponges’ in 1868, while Alphonse Gal 
travelled to Greece in order to complete his own thesis 
that was published in 1872, where he recorded the 
symptoms of the disease by himself [5–7]. He gradually 
became more interested in the supply of compressed air 
to mines and caissons of underwater constructions, such 
as the construction of large bridges like the Eads Bridge in 
St. Louis and the Brooklyn Bridge in New York City, where 
decompression sickness or ‘caisson disease’ was also ob-
served. On account of that observation, Alphonse Jaminet 
(1871) and Andrew Smith (1873) — the doctors overseeing 
the construction of Eads Bridge and Brooklyn Bridge re-
spectively — published two studies describing the disease 
and their experiments [8, 9]. In 1878, Paul Bert laid the 
foundations of hyperbaric medicine in his monumental 
work ‘La Pression Barométrique rechearches de Physiologie 
Expérimentale’ [10, 11].
 Despite widespread dissent, it appears that the dangers 
of the disease had been known in Greece at least since 
the 1860s, when the first diving suits were used by the 
Dodecanesian sponge divers. In 1867, Auguste Denayrouze 
published a manual on the use of diving suits, which offered 
clear and specific instructions to those who descended up 
to 50 metres: ‘Ascending very slowly, the diver can avoid 
abrupt transition to atmospheric pressure. Periodical stops 
(during ascent) help to make decompression smooth’ [4]. 
Studies on decompression sickness were also conducted 
in Greece. In 1881, I. Tetsis published his study titled ‘L’île 
Figure 1. Professor Konstantinos Savvas (1861–1929) (Histori-
cal Archive of the Department of Microbiology, Medical School, 
National and Kapodistrian University of Athens)
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d’Hydra et les maladies des plongeurs’ in Paris, distin-
guishing between four levels of the disease: temporary 
cerebral congestion, paraplegia, haemorrhage that may lead 
to death, and comatose state that always leads to death [4]. 
Of major importance was the study of K. Katsaras, who 
studied 62 divers suffering from the disease [12].
THE MEDICAL rECOrDs  
OF WArsHIP ‘KrITI’
The warship accompanied the Greek fishing fleets 
in four expeditions: 7 May – 20 October 1900, 12 May 
– 20 October 1901, 17 May –16 October 1902 and 
15 May – 24 October 1903. The health records of divers 
who suffered from the disease between 1900 and 1903 
were handed to Savvas and highlighted various aspects and 
risk factors of the disease. 
WOrKING CONDITIONs
The problem of decompression sickness lay in the highly 
problematic business model of the time and started long 
before the expedition itself. In order to be able to equip 
their ships, captains were forced to borrow heavily from the 
banks. They also borrowed capital from the private sector 
with interests of 24% to 36%, which had to be repaid within 
6 months, while their ships or even homes were put up as 
collateral for those loans. Moreover, it was lenders who 
provided captains with the necessary equipment, usually 
at very high prices. As a result, captains were already in-
debted before they had even set sail and their only hope 
lay in harvesting large quantities of sponges. Any delays in 
their departure meant that divers had wasted their salaries, 
thus they too could only set their hopes on harvesting many 
sponges since they would accordingly get a share of the 
profits. Captains were faced with pressing loans that gave 
rise to irrational demands for more and more dives, a reality 
that proved to be a major risk factor for accidents. The cap-
tains’ burden was passed on to the divers who, according 
to Savvas, ‘lost their freedom and became slaves of the 
captain’. Similarly, the oral testimonies of captains indicate 
that they, in turn, were slaves of their lenders: ‘When you 
have borrowed a lot of money and mortgaged your house, 
you have to earn that money and the time is not enough. 
Therefore, the people (divers) must ascend quickly’; ‘How 
many hours does the day need to have for me to be able 
to do my job, to earn the money that is not mine, to pay the 
bank, to pay the people?’ [4].
THE DIVErs’ PrOFILE
The profile of the proud diver and tragic hero who boldly 
confronts real and mythical dangers in the great depths of 
the sea and thoughtlessly spends all his money while on 
land, since any of his next trips might be his final one, has 
long been inscribed in Greek historical consciousness. On 
the other hand, the drama of mothers and wives of dead 
or handicapped divers has been an integral part of island 
societies [4]. Each ship was manned by 8–12 divers aged 
19–45, many of whom came from continental Greece in 
search of easy profits but lacking familiarity with the ma-
rine environment. For instance, the records revealed that 
numerous divers had formerly worked as farmers, shep-
herds, carpenters, builders, barbers, railroad employees or 
in various other professions that were completely unrelated 
to marine life and the dangers of the sea. 
sAFETY rULEs
The records of warship ‘Kriti’ illustrate that safety rules 
were essentially absent from diving. The Hellenic Navy em-
ployed no divers who would dive to such great depths, since 
their main mission rested in performing maintenance tasks 
on the hulls of ships. This was the main reason why no casu-
alties were recorded in the Navy, coupled with the rigorous 
military standards that were strictly followed by its divers. 
Civilian divers, on the other hand, experienced a totally 
different situation. The whole process was outside state 
regulation and anyone could become a diver, even without 
training, while basic safety rules were absent from fishing 
vessels whose equipment was outdated and dangerous.
The inspections of fishing vessels conducted by officers 
and doctors revealed crucial violations in relation to their 
equipment, like diving suits lacking maintenance, helmets 
lacking lanterns or cables of communication with the ship, 
oxygen pump pistons lubricated with animal fat that contam-
inated the air inside helmets, or pumps that channelled hot 
air due to their poor maintenance. A notable effect of these 
deficiencies was the case of the release and detachment 
of a diver’s helmet while working at a depth of 40 metres. 
Professional divers dived up to 6 times during their shift 
and usually worked at a depth of 45–60 metres, sometimes 
reaching 80 metres. They ascended really fast and would 
‘hurl at high speed and immediately remove their diving suit 
in order for the next diver to use it and for them to go to 
rest’. Each dive lasted 40–50 minutes: ‘On 27 June 1903, 
a diver of the ship Evangelistria dived to 30 metres and 
remained on the seabed for 50 minutes, then ascending 
fast and not smoothly. After one hour and a half, he dived 
again to the same depth and remained underwater for 
45 minutes. One hour later he dived to 30 metres and 
stayed for 35 minutes. When he ascended, he reported diz-
ziness and lost his consciousness. As soon as he regained 
consciousness, he felt numbness on his limbs and was 
unable to stand. Complete paralysis ensued…’ 
A regretful finding rests in the testimonies of divers, who 
secretly entrusted them to the Navy officers. Some captains 
ignored divers’ signals for ascent, not allowing them to 
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return to the ship or forcing them to dive again when they 
considered the quantities of sponges they had harvested to 
be insufficient. On the other hand, some operators of oxygen 
pumps mentioned that divers themselves often ignored 
their signals in light of discovering hundreds of sponges, 
suffering from what they called ‘seabed drunkenness’ that 
made them want to collect them all [4].
The divers’ diet was satisfactory and included fish, meat 
and legumes, while they had 2 to 4 meals a day. Pressure 
and tension, however, led to excessive smoking and alco-
hol consumption. Savvas considered the usual practice 
of consuming an alcoholic drink in between dives to be 
burdensome for the divers’ overall health. In a time when 
the concept of risk factor was unclear, Savvas was able to 
distinguish alcohol as a significant factor that could cause 
accidents.
DECOMPrEssION sICKNEss IN NUMbErs
According to Savvas, Paul Bert had been informed that 
30 Greek divers died on average every year during the 
1870s. The studies conducted by Greek doctors referred 
to ten deaths per year but indicated equally high rates of 
disability. Between the years 1878–1900 it was estimated 
that approximately 100 divers had died while more than 
800 were left paralysed. Unfortunately, there is no conclu-
sive and systematic data on the exact number of victims 
per island. For instance, it has been reported that ‘more 
than 15 died every summer’ in the Dodecanese during the 
1870s. Russian Professor Karolus Flegel, a renowned and 
staunch objector of diving using a diving suit, pointed out 
that at least 800 divers had died from the island of Kalym-
nos since the introduction of the diving suit, a number that 
remains to be verified [4].
The records from the period 1900–1903, however, of-
fered a more coherent picture of the prevailing situation. 
The records of ‘Kriti’ included the number of patients, the 
seriousness of their condition, as well as the number of 
those who did not survive. All patients were grouped into age 
groups, whereas the doctors also classified symptoms into 
‘disorders of the central nervous system’, ‘heart disorders’ 
and ‘lung disorders’. Particular attention was paid to paral-
ysis, which was categorised as ‘upper limb paresis’, ‘lower 
limb paresis’, ‘hemiplegia’, ‘upper limb paralysis’, ‘lower limb 
paralysis’, ‘perfect lower limb paralysis’ and ‘paralysis of the 
whole body’. Over the 4-year period covered in the records, 
a total of 936 divers were hospitalised, of whom 152 in seri-
ous condition. Twenty one of these 152 patients passed away, 
while those who survived developed some kind of disability. 
Ages 21–35, especially 26–30 (46%), represented the age 
spectrum that was mostly affected by decompression sick-
ness. As far as the type of paralysis is concerned, paralysis 
of the lower extremities was the most common.
The presence of the warship and the lax controls did not 
have any effect on captains, since the legislative framework 
was essentially non-existent and the naval officers were 
unable to intervene. On the other hand, many captains 
pulled away from the fleets and resumed their oppressive 
behaviour towards divers. For instance, 60 divers working 
on the fishing vessels that had abandoned the fleet in 1901 
died outside Benghazi in Libya. 
 This situation changed during the last expedition of 
‘Kriti’ in 1903, when the naval officers acquired extended 
powers that allowed them to conduct sworn interrogations. 
This tactic scared the captains, who began to adhere to the 
newly-established safety rules of the Ministry of Marine 
Affairs. The interrogations carried out in 1903 revealed 
that — besides the three divers hospitalised aboard ‘Kriti’ 
who passed away — another 24 divers had also died in that 
same year. On the other hand, the officers were unable to 
verify the worrying allegations of another 40 dead divers. In 
any case, contemporary estimates placed the total number 
of Greek divers onboard the Greek shipping vessels during 
the last expedition of ‘Kriti’ at 900, of whom 100–150 
either died or acquired some kind of disability. It should be 
clarified that the failure to record the total number of deaths 
may have been due to the fact that some islands remained 
under Ottoman control and thus the Greek ships still carried 
the Ottoman flag. As a result, the Greek authorities were 
informed of accidents only when a captain contacted the 
Greek consulates in the Greek islands controlled by the 
Ottomans.
MEDICAL FINDINGs FrOM THE rECOrDs
Savvas’ report confirmed the aggravating factors for 
decompression sickness that were already mentioned in 
contemporary bibliography, namely diving depth, duration 
of stay on the seabed and number of consecutive dives. The 
disease was linked to the three stages of diving: increas-
ing pressure during descent, high atmospheric pressure 
while on the seabed and abrupt divers’ ascent. According 
to the records, decompression sickness appeared shortly 
after ascent and removal of the helmet of the diving suit. 
Divers suddenly felt malaise, dizziness and imbalance, 
pain in the precordium that extended to the left shoulder 
and nape, headache, tinnitus, aphasia, thirst and burning 
in the epigastrium. 
Divers presented shortness of breath for 30 minutes, 
followed by faint and anaesthesia for 15 minutes. By the 
time a diver regained consciousness, all symptoms had 
disappeared only to be replaced by symptoms of paralysis. 
Over the next 4–8 hours, the unfortunate diver felt numb-
ness throughout his body, losing his ability to move and 
experiencing paraesthesia in the upper and lower limbs. 
This situation resulted in hemiplegia, monoplegia or cervical 
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and head movement ability only. Over the next 3–5 days, 
the diver experienced urinary retention that was followed 
by urinary incontinence. Upon his recovery, the patient was 
able to walk only with the help of a walking cane. 
sTATE INTErVENTION IN rEsPONsE  
TO sAVVAs’ rEPOrT 
Following the tragic conditions that came to light from 
the data, the Ministry of Marine Affairs was called upon to 
take immediate action at various levels. At that point, the 
influence of Professor Savvas’ prestige came into play, 
definitely corroborated by his relationship with the royal 
family. Numerous of his proposals were eventually taken 
into account and largely influenced the nature of the divers’ 
profession.
The first measure provided for keeping a book where 
captains recorded all dives performed by the divers onboard 
their ships. Each entry had to include the site, depth and 
duration of a dive, along with the name of the diver and 
the signatures of the captain and two representatives of 
the divers who oversaw the whole process. Upon returning 
from an expedition, the captain handed over the book to 
the port authorities for inspection. 
In turn, divers had to be healthy, that is, not suffer from 
cardiac, haematologic, urinary or nervous system diseases 
(or rheumatic diseases, based on contemporary medical 
perceptions), whereas dives had to be performed 3–4 hours 
after consuming a meal. In addition, professional divers had 
to be aged 21–35, while the establishment of the School of 
Divers was decided, where prospective divers would obtain 
a diploma and basic first aid knowledge.
The safety rules that were introduced were designed in 
line with those of the German Navy in 1898. This should not 
come as a surprise, given that Prof. Savvas had received 
further training in the Institute of Public Health of Berlin 
and was generally familiar with the German scientific way 
of thinking. Based on those criteria, the duration of under-
Figure 2. Metal suit P-7 Neufeldt and Kuhnk in section. Glass- 
-slide from the lectures of Prof. Savvas on Divers’ Hygiene. (Prof. 
K. Savvas Collection, Historical Archive of the Department of 
Microbiology, Medical School, National and Kapodistrian Uni-
versity of Athens) Figure 3. Test of P-7 Neufeldt and Kuhnk (France 1926). Glass
-slide from the lectures of Prof. Savvas on Divers’ Hygiene. (Prof. 
K. Savvas Collection, Historical Archive of the Department of 
Microbiology, Medical School, National and Kapodistrian Uni-
versity of Athens)
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water stay was defined as follows: 1 hour at 9–10 metres, 
15 minutes at 23–25 metres, 10 minutes at 35–42 metres, 
5 minutes at 42–47 metres, 3 minutes at 47–50 metres 
and 1 minute at 50–55 metres. As far as the other technical 
parameters were concerned, the rate of ascent was set at 
2 metres per minute, while oxygen pressure should not 
exceed 5 atmospheres (atm). It was also determined that 
3 months after their therapy, divers could start diving again 
on the following terms: no more than 3 times a day, at depths 
of 8–10 metres, remaining underwater for 15–30 minutes.
A key development that originated from Savvas’ report 
was the fact that divers were no longer unprotected, as 
employers were to be held accountable and subject to pun-
ishment. Firstly, captains were now prohibited from coercing 
divers to multiple dives, whereas they had no right to ask 
a diver to dive when the latter suffered from any disease. 
Moreover, in the event of an accident, interrogations were 
carried out and those deemed responsible were brought to 
justice. In this context too, Savvas proposed that the laws 
of the German Criminal Code were put in place. Although 
a diver’s death would be regarded as negligent homicide, 
the sentences ranged from heavy fines and seizure of the 
ship to imprisonment for 3 months to 3 years. But Savvas 
left nothing to chance, as he took another aspect of the 
problem into account and provided for the establishment 
of a pension fund for divers, which was maintained through 
employers’ contributions and offered financial assistance to 
the widows and orphans of deceased divers. Additionally, 
a special framework was established that prevented lenders 
from imposing interest rates of more than 10%, thereby 
relieving captains from the strain of repayment and fear 
of their ships being confiscated. As a result, captains’ be-
haviour towards the divers changed altogether.
In spite of scientific work, decrees, legislative efforts and 
public complaints, the concept of work-related accidents 
and the identification of the causes of death in sponge div-
ing remained controversial until the whole sector became 
obsolete in the aftermath of World War II. Even in the 1970s, 
divers demanded that their whole salaries were paid in 
advance, on the grounds that they would likely never return 
from the upcoming expedition [4].
Being the most relevant experts, the doctors of the Hel-
lenic Navy continued their research unabated. Two doctors 
who had been trained in Kronstadt promoted the adapta-
tion of the diving tactics of Greek sponge divers to new 
standards, suggesting that they stayed on the seabed for 
a brief period of time and ascended slowly [13, 14]. After 
tackling the problem of decompression sickness, Professor 
Savvas became involved in other sectors of public health 
and focused on the major infectious diseases of the time. 
Nevertheless, he continued to reflect on issues pertaining 
to the health of professional divers from an educational per-
spective, incorporating them in the lectures on hygiene that 
he offered to his students at the Medical School (Figs. 2, 3).
CONCLUsIONs
The history of Greek sponge divers in the early 20th 
century represents a classic and timeless example of safety 
rules violation arising from economic competition and hard-
ship. Lacking regulation and any form of state oversight, 
professional sponge diving proved to be extremely deadly. 
Of course, that era was completely different from modern 
times in relation to divers’ professionalism, safety rules 
and labour rights, since nowadays a strict legal framework 
has been put in place to protect professional divers. The 
prospect of exploitation, however, which leads to violations 
of the safety rules governing this high-risk profession un-
der the pressure of competition, coupled with voluntary 
or involuntary acceptance of such situations by the divers 
themselves, poses a serious risk factor for accidents. On the 
other hand, the institutions entrusted with overseeing the 
profession must always be alert and prepared, especially in 
times of financial crisis when working conditions are subject 
to changes and pressures. 
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